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THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT OF
1976: MISJOINDER, NONJOINDER, AND
COLLUSIVE JOINDER
J. THOMPSON THORNTON* AND AURORA A. ARES**
I. INTRODUCTION
UJNLIKE UNITED STATES airlines, foreign air carriers
are often owned and operated by their respective na-
tional governments. Additionally, foreign state-owned
commercial ventures participate in the business of com-
mercial aviation by manufacturing aircraft engines and
other components. It is, therefore, not unusual to see the
joinder of a foreign government as the defendant in inter-
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national air crash litigation. I
This article will examine the rules that govern the join-
der of a foreign state in personal injury and wrongful
death actions arising from aviation accidents. It will also
examine how the joinder of a foreign state, even as third-
party defendant, permits the removal of the entire case to
federal court, including the first-party claims brought
against private entities, and how such removal facilitates
the dismissal of actions brought by foreign plaintiffs
under the federal forum non conveniens standard. Fi-
nally, this article will note recent decisions on the law of
fraudulent and collusive joinder, which further facilitate
the joinder of the foreign state defendant, even when that
joinder results in the removal of the action to federal
court against the plaintiff's wishes.
II. THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT
OF 1976
A discussion of tort litigation brought in the United
States against a foreign state must begin with a discussion
of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA
or the Act) .2 The FSIA prescribes the subject matter ju-
risdiction of state and federal courts over actions brought
against a foreign state or its agencies and instrumentali-
ties3 and provides comprehensive procedures for such
suits. 4 The Act provides the sole basis for obtaining juris-
diction over foreign sovereigns in United States courts.5
I See, e.g., Compafiia Mexicana de Aviacion, S.A. v. U. S. Dist. Ct., 859 F.2d
1354 (9th Cir. 1988).
2 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1988 & Supp. I 1990).
3 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1988).
4 Before the FSIA's enactment, foreign sovereigns sued in the United States
requested that the State Department make a formal suggestion of immunity to the
court. The FSIA was enacted to transfer the determinations of immunity from the
political executive branch to the courts where determinations of immunity could
be made "on purely legal grounds and under procedures that insure due pro-
cess." H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604-06. [hereinafter HousE REPORT].
I Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 434
(1989).
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It codifies the "restrictive" theory of foreign sovereign
immunity, extending immunity to cases arising from a for-
eign state's public acts but subjecting foreign states to suit
in United States courts arising from a foreign state's com-
mercial activity.6
III. MISJOINDER
United States courts will dismiss a foreign state that is
joined with other private or domestic defendants in an ac-
tion, if the foreign state is entitled to immunity under the
FSIA.7 Thejoinder of a foreign state in air crash litigation
in the United States is, therefore, preliminarily a function
of the substantive question of whether one of the FSIA's
exceptions to immunity applies to the claim against the
foreign state.
A. EXCEPTIONS TO SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
The FSIA prescribes exceptions to foreign sovereign
immunity in suits based on a foreign state's commercial or
private acts. Commercial activity is defined as:
[e]ither a regular course of commercial conduct or a
particular commercial transaction or act. The commercial
character of an activity shall be determined by reference to
the nature of the course of conduct or particular transac-
tion or act, rather than by reference to its purpose.8
As the Act's drafters have noted:
[a] "regular course of commercial conduct" includes the
carrying on of a commercial enterprise such as a mineral
extraction company, an airline or a state trading corpora-
tion. Certainly, if an activity is customarily carried on for
profit, its commercial nature could readily be assumed. At
6 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 6613.
1 See, e.g., America West Airlines, Inc. v. GPA Group, Ltd., 877 F.2d 793 (9th
Cir. 1989). An exhaustive discussion of the FSIA's application is beyond the
scope of this article. Therefore, this discussion will focus on the FSIA in cases
involving personal injuries or property damage in the context of international avi-
ation litigation.
8 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d).
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the other end of the spectrum, a single contract, if of the
same character as a contract which might be made by a
private person, could constitute a "particular transaction
or act."
In determining whether the act of a foreign state is
commercial and not sovereign or public, an important fac-
tor is whether a private person could have engaged in
similar conduct.' 0 In Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical
Center v. Hellenic Republic" the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals held that a foreign state's contract with United
States health care providers to provide kidney transplants
for Greek nationals was commercial and not sovereign in
nature.12 The court based its holding on the fact that pri-
vate parties routinely enter into contracts to reimburse
health care providers for medical services performed. 13
1. The "Waiver" Exception
Structurally, the FSIA "starts from a premise of immu-
nity, and then creates exceptions to the general princi-
ple."1 4 The first exception, which is seen in air crash
litigation, involves the waiver of sovereign immunity and
provides:
[a] foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdic-
tion of courts of the United States or of the States in any
case in which the foreign state has waived its immunity
either explicitly or by implication, notwithstanding any
withdrawal of the waiver which the foreign state may pur-
9 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 6614-15 (emphasis added).
10 Id. at 6615.
1' 877 F.2d 574 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 937 (1989).
21 Id. at 575.
13 Id. at 581.
1 H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1976), repinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6616. 28 U.S.C. § 1604 provides:
Subject to existing international agreements to which the United
States is a party at the time of enactment of this Act a foreign state
shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United
States and of the States except as provided in sections 1605 to 1607
of this chapter.
28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1988).
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port to effect except in accordance with the terms of the
15waiver ....
One court has held that a foreign state implicitly waives
its sovereign immunity by signing a contract stating that it
will be governed by the laws of the District of Columbia. 6
Another has held that a foreign state implicitly waives its
sovereign immunity by failing to raise the defense of sov-
ereign immunity in its responsive pleading.' 7
2. Exceptions Based Upon "Commercial Activity"
The second exception to sovereign immunity involves
actions arising out of the foreign state's commercial activ-
ity in or directed at the United States. This exception is
divided into three subparts. 8
a. An Action Based Upon Commercial Activity in the
United States
The first of these commercial activity exceptions pro-
vides that "[a] foreign state shall not be immune from the
jurisdiction of courts of the United States or of the States
in any case in which the action is based upon a commer-
cial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign
state."1 9 As defined by the Act, "[a]'commercial activity
carried on in the United States by a foreign state' means
commercial activity carried on by such state and having
substantial contact with the United States."120 Therefore,
taking this definition together with the first commercial
is 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (1988). The FSIA prescribes other exceptions to im-
munity, not discussed here, involving inter alia, cases in which rights in property
are taken in violation of international law when there is some connection between
such property and commercial activities of the foreign state in the United States
and cases in which rights in property in the United States acquired by succession
or gift or rights in immovable property situated in the United States are in issue.
See generally 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605(a)(3)-(4), 1605(b), 1607, 1610, 1611 (1988).
16 Marlowe v. Argentine Naval Comm'n, 604 F. Supp. 703 (D.D.C. 1985).
7 Corporacion Venezolana de Fomento v. Vintero Sales Corp., 477 F. Supp.
615, 619 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
i8 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1988).
19 Id.
'o 28 U.S.C. § 1603(e) (1988).
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activity exception to immunity, the clause would read as
follows: a foreign state shall not be immune from the ju-
risdiction of courts of the United States or of the States in
any case in which the action is based upon a commercial
activity carried on by such state and having substantial
contact with the United States.
Despite this broad language, courts have read this ex-
ception narrowly, generally requiring that there be a
"nexus" or "link" between the plaintiff's action and the
foreign state's commercial activity in the United States.2 '
Consequently, a United States plaintiff who is injured in
an air crash that occurs outside the United States on a
flight unconnected to the United States cannot bring an
action in the United States against the culpable foreign
state-owned air carrier, even though that foreign state
conducts substantial commercial aviation activity in the
United States and even if it causes pecuniary loss or per-
sonal injuries to that United States resident.
For example, in In re Disaster at Riyadh Airport,22 plain-
tiff's decedent was killed in an inflight fire aboard a Saudi
Arabian Airlines' flight between two cities in Saudi Ara-
bia. The airline was wholly owned by the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia. Plaintiff's claim against the Kingdom was
held not to fall within any exception to the immunity of
the Kingdom, since the relationship between the negli-
gent operation of the aircraft in Saudi Arabia and the
commercial activity of the Kingdom in the United States
was too attenuated to trigger the first commercial activity
21 The "nexus" test has been adopted by the Second, Third, Fifth, Seventh,
Ninth and Eleventh Circuits. See Gemini Shipping Inc. v. Foreign Trade Org. for
Chem. & Foodstuffs, 647 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1981); Sugarman v. Aeromexico, Inc.,
626 F.2d 270 (3d Cir. 1980); Vencedora Oceancia Navigacion, S.A. v. Compagnie
Nationale Algerienne De Navigation, 730 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1984); Santos v.
Compagnie Nationale Air France, 934 F.2d 890 (7th Cir. 1991); America West
Airlines, Inc. v. GPA Group, Ltd., 877 F.2d 793 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Nelson v.
Saudi Arabia, 923 F.2d 1528 (lth Cir. 1991), rev'd on other grounds, 61 U.S.L.W.
4253 (U.S. Mar. 23, 1993) (concluding that in a claim resting "entirely upon activ-
ities sovereign in character .... jurisdiction will not exist under [the first clause of
§ 1605(a)(2)] regardless of any connection the sovereign acts may have with com-
mercial activity").
22 16 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,880 (D.D.C. 1981).
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exception to foreign sovereign immunity.2
Similarly, in Kramer v. Boeing Co.,24 a United States citi-
zen was injured when an engine caught fire on a Sabena
Belgian World Airlines (Sabena) aircraft in the Republic
of Cameroon. The defendant engine manufacturer, Pratt
& Whitney (P&W), filed a third party complaint against
Sabena, a "foreign state" under FSIA, alleging that
Sabena negligently performed maintenance and service
duties on the failed engine. The court found that "[t]he
only nexus between the alleged negligence of Sabena and
Sabena's commercial activities in the United States [was]
that the engine part which [allegedly caused] the fire was
purchased by Sabena from Pratt & Whitney in the United
States."25 The court held that the link to Sabena's alleged
negligence was too attenuated to apply the commercial
activities exception.2 6
In another decision, Tote v. Iberia International Airlines,27
the court held that United States courts had no jurisdic-
tion over a wrongful death claim of a United States citizen
arising from the crash of a domestic Spanish flight where
the ticket was purchased in Spain.28 In Castillo v. Shipping
Corp. of India29 there was no jurisdiction over a personal
injury action brought against an Indian state-owned cor-
poration by a citizen of the Dominican Republic that arose
out of an accident occurring on the corporation's vessel in
the Dominican Republic, even though the corporation
carried on shipping activities having substantial contact
with United States.3 0
Therefore, it is only when the plaintiff's personal injury
or wrongful death action has some specific nexus with the
foreign air carrier's commercial activity in the United
2 Id. at 17,881.
24 705 F. Supp. 1392 (D. Minn 1989).
25 Id. at 1395.
26 Id. at 1395-96.
27 649 F. Supp. 41 (E.D. Pa. 1986).
28 Id. at 43.
2 606 F. Supp. 497 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
30 Id. at 501-02.
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States that the FSIA vests federal and state courts with
subject matter jurisdiction. In Sugarman v. Aeromexico,
Inc.,s ' for example, the plaintiff, a United States citizen,
alleged that an extended delay at Acapulco Airport caused
him serious heart problems. The court held that the ac-
tion had sufficient nexus with the foreign state-owned air-
line's commercial activity in the United States since the
round-trip flight's return leg was bound for New York
City and the airline tickets were purchased in New
Jersey.3 2
Similarly, in Barkanic v. General Admininstration of Civil
Aviation of Peoples Republic of China,33 wrongful death ac-
tions were brought against the Civil Aviation Administra-
tion of the Peoples Republic of China, arising from the
crash of a domestic flight in China. The Second Circuit
Court of Appeals held that plaintiffs' actions had sufficient
nexus with China's commercial activity in the United
States. The Chinese Civil Aviation Administration had
conducted substantial commercial aviation operations in
the United States by employing ticketing agents in the
United States and using passenger tickets for the flight,
which were purchased in the United States through a tick-
eting agent of the Chinese agency. 4
Analogously, in Nelson v. Saudi Arabia," plaintiff brought
an action arising from injuries allegedly inflicted by
agents of the Saudi Arabian government in retaliation for
his reporting of safety violations while he was employed at
a Saudi hospital. The Eleventh Circuit held that plain-
tiff's action had a sufficient nexus with Saudi Arabia's
commercial activity in the United States in that plaintiff
had been recruited in the United States to monitor com-
pliance with safety regulations in the hospital. Plaintiff's
"detention and torture [were] so intertwined with his em-
31 626 F.2d 270 (3d Cir. 1980).
32 Id. at 273.
3s 822 F.2d 11 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 964 (1987).
34 Id. at 13.
35 923 F.2d 1528 (1 lth Cir. 1991), revd, 61 U.S.L.W. 4253 (U.S. Mar. 23, 1993).
[58
JOINDER UNDER THE FSIA
ployment at the Hospital that they [were] 'based upon' his
recruitment and hiring, in the United States, for employ-
ment at the Hospital in Saudi Arabia."'3 6 The United
States Supreme Court reversed, stating that "where a
claim rests entirely upon activities sovereign in character,
as here . . ., jurisdiction will not exist under that clause
[§ 1605(a)(2)] regardless of any connections the sover-
eign acts may have with commercial activity."' 37 Thus, the
court did not address the nexus test, which would be used
when a claim rests on both commercial and sovereign
elements.38
Finally, in Ministry of Supply, Cairo v. Universe Tankships,
Inc.,9 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
commercial activity exception applied to a time char-
terer's claim for loss of the use of a vessel that resulted
from Egypt's delay in unloading the vessel's cargo of
wheat at an Egyptian port. The court held that the FSIA
withdraws immunity for claims based upon acts outside
the United States that "comprise an integral part of the
state's 'regular course of commercial conduct' " in the
United States.4 ° Characterized in such fashion, the court
held that it had jurisdiction over a claim, which, it noted,
was based upon Egypt's purchase of wheat in the United
States and its transportation to Egypt, and not just on
Egypt's misconduct in the course of unloading the vessel
at the Egyptian port.4 '
In addition to the "nexus" test, one court has given the
first commercial activity exception to sovereign immunity
a broader interpretation, applying what has been called
the "doing business" commercial activity test. In In re Rio
Grande Transport, Inc. 42 the court held that it had jurisdic-
tion over a limitation action involving injury, death, and
36 Id. at 1535.
37 Nelson v. Saudi Arabia, 61 U.S.L.W. 4253, - n.4 (U.S. Mar. 23, 1993).
s8 See id.
39 708 F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1983).
40 Id. at 84 (citations omitted).
41 Id.
412 516 F. Supp. 1155 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
1993]
712 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE
lost cargo claims arising out of a collision between a
United States vessel and an Algerian state-owned vessel in
the Mediterranean sea.43 Even though the action involved
an Algerian vessel that only operated between Europe
and Algeria, the district court held that the action arose
out of the regular course of Algeria's worldwide shipping
activity involving seventy vessels and, as such, the action
arose out of a regular course of commercial activity hav-
ing substantial contact with the United States." However,
this "doing business" reading of the clause has not been
followed by other courts.
b. An Action Based Upon an Act in the United States
in Connection With Commercial Activity
Elsewhere
The second commercial activity exception to foreign
sovereign immunity provides that "[a] foreign state shall
not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the
United States or of the States in any case in which the ac-
tion is based upon an act performed in the United States
in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign
state elsewhere. ' 45 As the drafters noted:
[e]xamples of this type of situation might include: a rep-
resentation in the United States by an agent of a foreign
state that leads to an action for restitution based on unjust
enrichment; an act in the United States that violates U.S.
securities laws or regulations; the wrongful discharge in
the United States of an employee of the foreign state who
has been employed in connection with a commercial activ-
ity carried on in some third country.
Although some or all of these acts might also be consid-
ered to be a "commercial activity carried on in the United
States" as defined in section 1603(e), it has seemed advisa-
ble to provide expressly for the case where a claim arises
out of a specific act in the United States which is commer-
43 Id. at 1162.
44 Id.
45 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1988).
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cial or private in nature and which relates to a commercial
activity abroad. It should be noted that the acts (or omis-
sions) encompassed in this category are limited to those
which in and of themselves are sufficient to form the basis
of a cause of action. 46
In Sugarman v. Aeromexico, Inc. 47 and Vencedora Oceancia
Navigacion v. Compagnie Nationale Algerienne De Navigation,4 8
the Third and Fifth Circuits suggested that the second
commercial activity exception to foreign sovereign immu-
nity applies to actions based upon misconduct that takes
place in the United States. 49 This view is supported in
Harris v. Vao Intourist, Moscow,5 0 where suit was brought
against two Soviet state-owned tourist services to recover
for the alleged wrongful death of a United States tourist
in a fire at a Moscow hotel where he was a guest. Even
though the tourist services engaged in substantial com-
mercial activity in the United States, the court held that
the action was not based upon an act in the United States
in connection with commercial activity elsewhere since
the negligent act causing the injuries did not occur in the
United States.5 Additionally, in Filus v. Lot Polish Air-
lines, 2 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
failure of a foreign state-owned manufacturer to warn
United States passengers of defective aircraft engines was
not an allegation constituting an act performed in the
United States such as to trigger this second commercial
activity exception to the FSIA.53
46 HouSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 6617-18.
47 626 F.2d 270 (3d Cir. 1980).
48 730 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1984).
49 626 F.2d at 273; 730 F.2d at 200-01.
-o 481 F. Supp. 1056 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
5' Id. at 1061.
52 907 F.2d 1328 (2d Cir. 1990).
53 Id. at 1333.
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c. An Action Based Upon Commercial Activity
Elsewhere Having a Direct Effect in the United
States
The third commercial activity exception to foreign sov-
ereign immunity provides:
[a] foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdic-
tion of courts of the United States or of the States in any
case . . . in which the action is based upon . . . an act
outside the territory of the United States in connection
with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere
and that act causes a direct effect in the United States.54
The cases construing this exception hold that a personal
injury suffered abroad does not cause a "direct effect in
the United States," even though it causes the injured per-
son or a decedent's personal representative damages in
the form of physical suffering, medical expenses, or eco-
nomic loss in the United States. 5 However, property
damage cases fare better in United States courts. In In re
Rio Grande Transport, Inc. 56 the collision of an American
vessel with an Algerian vessel in the Mediterranean Sea
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1988).
55 See, e.g., Upton v. Empire of Iran, 459 F. Supp. 264, 266 (D.D.C. 1978), aff'd,
607 F.2d 494 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (finding no direct effect in wrongful death and
personal injury actions brought by Americans when the causes of action arose
from the collapse of a roof at an airport terminal building in Iran). In re Disaster
in Riyadh Airport, Saudi Arabia, on August 19, 1980, Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,880,
17,882 (D.D.C. 1981) (finding no direct effect in wrongful death actions arising
from injuries received on a flight between two Saudi Arabian cities); Zernicek v.
Brown & Root, Inc., 826 F.2d 415, 419 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1043
(1988) (finding no direct effect in a wrongful death action brought by an American
arising from exposure to radioactive material in Mexico); Compania Mexicana de
Aviacion, S.A. v. United States Dist. Ct., 859 F.2d 1354, 1360 (9th Cir. 1988)(finding no direct effect in 69 actions brought by Mexican decedents' estates aris-
ing from injuries sustained in a crash on a flight wholly within Mexico); Harris v.
VAO Intourist, Moscow, 481 F. Supp. 1056, 1065-66 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (finding no
direct effect in a wrongful death action arising from injuries sustained by an Amer-
ican tourist in a Moscow hotel); Kramer v. Boeing Co., 705 F. Supp, 1392 (D.
Minn. 1989) (finding no direct effect in a personal injury action arising from inju-
ries sustained in an engine fire on a flight in the Republic of Cameroon). These
cases hold that the physical suffering and economic loss in the United States re-
sulting from an injury abroad is indirect and fortuitous depending on where the
injured person or his/her representative might thereafter incur damage.
-6 516 F. Supp. 1155, 1163 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
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had a direct effect in the United States because the Ameri-
can vessel was the sole source of income of its American
corporate owner.
3. The Non-Commercial Tort Exception
The non-commercial tort exception to foreign sover-
eign immunity provides:
[a] foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdic-
tion of courts of the United States or of the States in any
case . . . in which money damages are sought against a
foreign state for personal injury or death, or damage to or
loss of property, occurring in the United States and caused
by the tortious act or omission of that foreign state or of
any official or employee of that foreign state while acting
within the scope of his office or employment; except this
paragraph shall not apply to-
(A) any claim based upon the exercise or performance or
the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function
regardless of whether the discretion be abused, or"
(B) any claim arising out of malicious prosecution, abuse
of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or in-
terference with contract rights.58
The United States Supreme Court has held that this
non-commercial tort exception only applies to injury or
property damage that occurs within the United States.5 9
Therefore, Argentina was immune in an action for dam-
age to a crude oil tanker resulting from a military attack
by the Argentine military during the Falklands war. 60 In
Olsen v. Government of Mexico, 6' however, the Ninth Circuit
held that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction
under this section over a wrongful death action brought
-1 The discretionary act function exception in this clause is generally analyzed
under the principles developed pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act. Joseph
v. Consulate Gen. of Nigeria, 830 F.2d 1018, 1026 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485
U.S. 905 (1988).
58 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (1988).
59 Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 439-40
(1989).
60Id.
61 729 F.2d 641 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 917 (1984).
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by United States citizens arising from the crash in the
United States of an aircraft alleged to have been negli-
gently operated by the Mexican government.62
4. Exception as to Counterclaims
A foreign state is not accorded sovereign immunity with
respect to certain counterclaims,65 as follows:
[i]n any action brought by a foreign state, or in which a
foreign state intervenes, in a court of the United States or
of a State, the foreign state shall not be accorded immu-
nity with respect to any counterclaim-(a) for which a for-
eign state would not be entitled to immunity under section
1605 of this chapter had such claim been brought in a sep-
arate action against the foreign state; or (b) arising out of
the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of
the claim of the foreign state; or (c) to the extent that the
counterclaim does not seek relief exceeding in amount or
differing in kind from that sought by the foreign state.'
In In re Oil Spill by "Amoco Cadiz" off the Coast of France65
the court held that claims by the Republic of France alleg-
ing negligent operation of an oil tanker by an oil com-
pany, and the oil company's counterclaims of negligence
by the Republic of France for failing to take preventive
steps to avoid the oil spill and in negligently implement-
ing cleanup efforts, arose out of the same "transaction or
occurrence" so as to withdraw sovereign immunity as to
the oil company's counterclaims against France under this
section and under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13.66
Cross-claims are similarly treated. In Ministry of Supply,
Cairo v. Universe Tankships, Inc. 67 a suit for cargo damage
was brought by Egypt's Ministry of Supply, a "foreign
state" under the FSIA, against the corporate owner of an
American vessel. A time charterer intervened and filed a
62 Id. at 645.
63 28 U.S.C. § 1607 (1988).
64 Id.
65 491 F. Supp. 161 (N.D. Il1. 1979).
6 7d. at 168.67 708 F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1983).
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cross-claim against the Egyptian agency for lost use of the
vessel during the period that Egypt delayed the unloading
of the cargo. Even though it was not a "counterclaim,"
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that the court
had jurisdiction over the cross-claim because it came
under one of the commercial activity exceptions to immu-
nity and it met the test of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
13(g), as it arose from "the same transaction or occur-
rence" as Egypt's claim for damaged cargo.68
B. THE FEDERAL RULES OF PROCEDURE GOVERNING
JOINDER OF PARTIES
In addition to these substantive considerations, the ap-
plicable rules of civil procedure supply additional con-
straints on the joinder of a foreign state. The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, however, provide for the liberal
joinder of parties and claims. Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 20 provides:
[a]ll persons... may be joined in one action as defendants
if there is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the
alternative, any right to relief... arising out of the same
transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occur-
rences or if any questions of law or fact common to all
defendants will arise in the action.69
There seems to be little dispute that a claim arising out of
an air crash and asserted jointly or alternatively against
the air carrier, the aircraft or part manufacturer, and the
flight crew, is one that arises out of the same "transaction
or occurrence" so as to permit the joinder of all entities
contributing to the negligent manufacture, operation and
maintenance of the aircraft.70
68 Id. at 85.
69 FED. R. Civ. P. 20.
70 See, e.g., Compania Mexicana De Aviacion, S.A. v. United States Dist. Court,
859 F.2d 1354, 1357 (9th Cir. 1988) (wrongful death action arising out of air
crash brought, inter alia, against air carrier and aircraft manufacturer); Keller v.
Transportes Aereos Militares Ecuadorianos, 601 F. Supp. 787 (D.D.C. 1985)
(wrongful death action arising out of air crash brought against aircraft's owner
and operator).
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Similarly, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14 allows a
defendant to bring suit against a third-party "who is or
may be liable to the third-party plaintiff for all or part of
the plaintiff's claim."' 7 Therefore, a defendant as third-
party plaintiff can implead a foreign state into litigation in
a United States court if, for example, the party can state a
claim for indemnity or contribution and the third-party
plaintiff's claim falls within one of the FSIA exceptions to
foreign sovereign immunity.
For example, in In re Oil Spill by "Amoco Cadiz" off the
Coast of France,72 claims arising from an oil spill were filed
against the Amoco International Oil Co. and others. De-
fendant Amoco filed third-party claims against the Repub-
lic of France and its various departments seeking
indemnity and contribution alleging that the Republic of
France negligently failed to implement an effective oil
spill contingency plan, failed to take initiatives to prevent
such accidents, and negligently performed clean-up ef-
forts. The court held that Amoco had sufficiently alleged
elements of duty, breach, causation, and damages, and
that, therefore, Amoco had stated cognizable causes of ac-
tion for contribution and indemnity and could implead
the Republic of France to directly defend against the
claims filed against Amoco.73
Claimants risk dismissal of their claims, however, if the
joinder requirements of the Federal Rules are not met. In
Campbell v. Commonwealth of Australia 74 plaintiff filed suit in
California state court against the Australian government
alleging that he had been wrongfully terminated from his
employment in Australia's United States Trade Office.
The action was removed pursuant to the FSIA removal
statute. When the court prevented plaintiff from serving
interrogatories on seventeen non-party Australian offi-
cials, on the basis that interrogatories can only be served
1' FED. R. Civ. P. 14.
72 491 F. Supp. 161 (N.D. II. 1979).
73 Id. at 168-69.
74 912 F.2d 468 (9th Cir. 1990) (unpublished disposition).
[58
1993] JOINDER UNDER THE FSIA 719
on parties, he then sought leave to amend his complaint
to join those officials for the purpose of serving interroga-
tories. The Ninth Circuit, however, upheld the district
court's dismissal of the claims on the basis that thejoinder
requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20, re-
quiring that a plaintiff be able to state a claim against the
party to be joined, were not met. 75
IV. NONJOINDER
Congress has conferred broad federal subject matter ju-
risdiction to the federal courts over actions determining
the liability of foreign states.76 Therefore, the FSIA is an
exception to the rule that removal statutes are to be nar-
rowly construed." In fact, the FSIA removes the entire
action including not only the claim asserted against the
foreign state, but also all other claims asserted against pri-
vate and domestic defendants.78 After removal to federal
court, defendants can request that the action be dismissed
pursuant to the federal forum non conveniens standard,
unavailable in some state courts.79
As will be seen below, the combined effects of the
FSIA's liberal removal provisions and the recent develop-
ments in the doctrine of forum non conveniens have re-
sulted in the "nonjoinder" of a potentially culpable
foreign state defendant in actions brought by foreign
plaintiffs in United States courts. This nonjoinder by
plaintiffs has given rise to thejoinder of a foreign state by
means of third-party claims and the subsequent removal
of the entire action by that third-party defendant.
Although commentators have noted that in the past,
75 Id.
76 Kathleen M. Keith, Note, Removal Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of
1976, Nolan v. Boeing Co., 919 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1990), 15 SUFFOLK TRANS-
NAT'L L.J. 868 (1992).
77 See Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108-09 (1941).
71 Arango v. Guzman Travel Advisors Corp., 621 F.2d 1371 (5th Cir. 1980); see
infra notes 84-94 and accompanying text.
19 Nolan v. Boeing Co., 919 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 59 U.S. 3701
(1990); see infra notes 103-11 and accompanying text.
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courts would sever and remand the main claims and only
retain jurisdiction over the third-party claims against the
foreign state,8 0 recent cases have held that the FSIA's
super-removal provisions permit the removal of an entire
action by a third-party foreign state defendant.8' There-
fore, a forum non conveniens dismissal of first-party as
well as third-party claims is available even when plaintiffs
do not join a foreign defendant in the action.
A. THE FSIA SUPER-REMOVAL STATUTE
To promote the uniformity of decision by encouraging
the bringing of actions involving foreign states in federal
court, the FSIA broadened the subject matter jurisdiction
of the district courts to include such actions, omitted aju-
risdictional amount, provided for strong removal author-
ity, and omitted the right to trial by jury. As the drafters
noted: "[s]uch broad jurisdiction in the Federal courts
should be conducive to uniformity in decision, which is
desirable since a disparate treatment of cases involving
foreign governments may have adverse foreign relations
consequences. 8s 2 The Act's emphasis on federal court ju-
risdiction over actions against foreign states is evident in
the broad removal provisions prescribed by 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441(d), which states:
[a]ny civil action brought in a State court against a for-
eign state as defined in section 1603(a) of this title may be
removed by the foreign state to the district court of the
United States for the district and division embracing the
place where such action is pending. Upon removal the ac-
tion shall be tried by the court without jury. Where re-
moval is based upon this subsection, the time limitations
of section 1446(b) of this chapter may be enlarged at any
time for cause shown.8 3
,0 Carol K. Young, Defending Litigation Against a Foreign Airline Under the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act, 51 J. AIR L. & COM., 461, 486 (1986).
"I See Nolan, 919 F.2d at 1061-62; In re Surinam Airways Holding Co., 974 F.2d
1255 (11 th Cir. 1992).
82 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 6611-12.
83 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d) (1988).
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As the FSIA drafters noted:
[i]n view of the potential sensitivity of actions against
foreign states and the importance of developing a uniform
body of law in this area, it is important to give foreign
states clear authority to remove to a Federal forum actions
brought against them in the State courts. New subsection
(d) of section 1441 permits the removal of any such action
at the discretion of the foreign state, even if there are mul-
tiple defendants and some of these defendants desire not
to remove the action or are citizens of the State in which
the action has been brought.84
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that
this right of removal is necessarily broad and encompass-
ing. This construction is in keeping with the congres-
sional intent to avoid inconsistent results and conflicting
adjudications in those particularly sensitive cases in which
the United States courts determine the possible culpable
conduct of foreign states:
Congress, pursuant to its unquestioned Art. 1 powers, has
enacted a broad statutory framework governing assertions
of foreign sovereign immunity. In so doing, Congress de-
liberately sought to channel cases against foreign sover-
eigns away from the state courts and into federal courts,
thereby reducing the potential for a multiplicity of con-
flicting results among the courts of the 50 States.85
Moreover, in Arango v. Guzman Travel Advisors Corp. ,86
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a foreign state
defendant in a multi-party suit, removing an action pursu-
ant to § 1441(d), removes the entire action, including
claims against private co-defendants.8 7 In that case, suit
was brought by vacationers who were detained by employ-
ees of the Dominican Republic's national airline and de-
nied entry into the country as "undesirable aliens" by
officials of the Dominican government. Plaintiffs brought
84 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 6631.
85 Verlinden, B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486-87 (1983).
- 621 F.2d 1371 (5th Cir. 1980).
87 Id. at 1377.
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suit against the airline, an FSIA "foreign state," and
against the hotel, travel agent and the tour organizer, who
collaborated in the marketing of the package tour. In
concluding that the FSIA conferred broad removal au-
thority over the nonfederal claims asserted against the do-
mestic defendants, the Arango court noted the Act's
legislative history:
[t]he Report of the House Judiciary Committee in its
section-by-section analysis of the FSIA, states that "[n]ew
subsection (d) of section 1441 permits the removal of any
such action at the discretion of the foreign state, even if
there are multiple defendants and some of these defendants desire not
to remove the action or are citizens of the State in which the action
has been brought."8
The court noted that the FSIA removal statute provides
for the removal of "civil actions" and not simply the
"claims" involving the foreign state defendant, and thus,
sanctions the super-removal authority.8 9 Moreover, it was
consistent with the general rule that the scope of removal
under other removal statutes is related to the extent of
the federal court's pendent jurisdiction. 90 Finally, the
court held the exercise of subject matter jurisdiction was
sanctioned by the United States Constitution. 9' Article
III, section 2, which outlines the "outer limits" of federal
subject matter jurisdiction, merely requires minimal di-
versity, an element satisfied in the Arango case.92
In a subsequent decision, Teledyne, Inc. v. Kone Corp.,9
the Ninth Circuit faced the same question decided in
Arango, but addressed the issue in the context of an al-
88 Id. at 1375 (emphasis added) (citing H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 32, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6631).
89 621 F.2d at 1376.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 1377 n.7. As the United States Supreme Court noted with regards to
the concept of minimal diversity, as the "outer limits" of federal diversity jurisdic-
tion: "Article III poses no obstacle to the legislative extension of federal jurisdic-
tion, founded on diversity, so long as any two adverse parties are not co-citizens."
State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 531 (1967).
92 Id.
93 892 F.2d 1404 (9th Cir. 1989).
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tered constitutional landscape. In Finley v. United States94
the United States Supreme Court held that federal subject
matter jurisdiction does not extend to pendent party
claims in the absence of clear statutory authority.95 Since
the scope of removal is related to the existence of pendent
party jurisdiction, the Teledyne court analyzed whether the
FSIA conferred such jurisdiction. However, like Arango,
the Ninth Circuit reviewed the FSIA's legislative history
and, noting that section "1441(d) expresses an intention
to give sovereign foreign defendants an absolute right to
a federal forum coupled with an unusually strong prefer-
ence for the consolidation of claims," the court concluded
that the FSIA authorized pendent party jurisdiction and
that, consequently, the FSIA removal by a foreign state
removes the entire action, where minimal diversity
exists .96
B. FORUM NON CONVENIENS: STATE VS. FEDERAL
STANDARDS
Another factor leading to the nonjoinder of a foreign
state in international air crash litigation is the disparity
between federal and state forum non conveniens stan-
dards.97 In Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert,98 the United States
490 U.S. 545 (1989).
95 Id. at 554.
- 892 F.2d at 1409.
97 Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a trial court may "decline to
exercise its jurisdiction, even though the court has venue, where it appears that
the convenience of the parties and the court, and the interest of justice indicate
that the action should be tried in another forum." Sibaja v. Dow Chem. Co., 757
F.2d 1215, 1218 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 948 (1985). In federal courts,
the doctrine derives from the court's inherent power, under Article III of the Con-
stitution, "to control the administration of the litigation before it" and to address
"whether the actions brought are vexatious or oppressive or whether the interests
of justice require that the trial be had in a more appropriate forum." Koster v.
Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co., 330 U.S. 518, 530 (1947).
The United States Supreme Court has stated:
The principle of forum non conveniens is simply that a court may
resist imposition upon its jurisdiction even when jurisdiction is au-
thorized by the letter of a general venue statute. These statutes are
drawn with a necessary generality and usually give a plaintiff a choice
of courts, so that he may be quite sure of some place in which to
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Supreme Court established a flexible standard pursuant
to which a trial court can dismiss an action brought in an
inconvenient forum.99 In Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, l00 the
Court held that, although plaintiff's initial forum choice is
normally to be given considerable weight, this presump-
tion applies with less force when the plaintiffs are for-
pursue his remedy. But the open door may admit those who seek
not simply justice but perhaps justice blended with some harass-
ment. A plaintiff sometimes is under temptation to resort to a strat-
egy of forcing the trial at a most inconvenient place for an adversary,
even at some inconvenience to himself.
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507 (1947).
98 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
In Gilbert, plaintiff operated a public warehouse in Lynchburg, Virginia, which
burned due to the defendant's alleged negligence. Plaintiff brought suit in the
United States Southern District Court of New York, against a Pennsylvania corpo-
ration doing business in Virginia and New York. The Supreme Court upheld the
dismissal even though venue in New York was proper, because plaintiff and most
of the witnesses lived there, the defendant did business there, and all of the events
concerning the litigation took place in Virginia. Id. at 510-13.
In formulating the basic forum non conveniens analysis, the Gilbert Court noted
that the forum non conveniens doctrine "presupposes at least two forums in
which the defendant is amenable to process." Id. at 506-07. The factors which
the trial court must weigh in determining the more convenient of the two forums
for the trial of the action include an analysis of the private interest of the litigants
and the public interest of the court and the community. Id. at 508. The private
interest factors are:
(1) the relative ease of access to sources of proof,
(2) the availability of compulsory process for the attendance of un-
willing witnesses,
(3) the cost of procuring willing witnesses,
(4) the possibility of viewing the premises if appropriate to the case,
and
(5) all other practical problems that make the trial of the case easy,
expeditious and inexpensive.
Id.
The public interest factors consist of:
(1) the court's administrative difficulties if litigation proceeds in a
congested court instead of proceeding in a forum with a closer tie to
the litigation,
(2) the burden ofjury duty on a community with no relation to the
case,
(3) the local interest of the forum in deciding a case of local import,
and
(4) the avoidance of unnecessary problems in conflict of laws, or the
application of foreign law.
Id. at 508-09.
1- 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
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eign.'' The test in Gilbert, as refined in Reyno, is now
routinely invoked in forum non conveniens dismissals of
foreign tort claims brought by foreign citizens in Ameri-
can courts. 10
2
Unless the Gilbert-Reyno test has been incorporated into
state law, however, the test only applies in federal
court.'0 3  Consequently, plaintiffs desiring to have their
foreign tort claims heard by United States juries have
been known to file suit in the state courts of those states
that do not recognize or strictly limit the trial court's dis-
cretion to dismiss a case on the basis of forum non con-
10, In Reyno, plaintiffs were representatives of citizens and residents of Scotland
who were killed in an air crash in Scotland. They brought suit in the United States
against American manufacturers of the airplane and of the plane's propellers.
The fact that the two manufacturers both resided in the United States and that the
court had jurisdiction over the defendants did not defeat a forum non conveniens
dismissal. The Supreme Court, applying the Gilbert factors, held Scotland to be
the appropriate forum for the litigation of the cases because the airplane was
owned and operated by a company organized in the United Kingdom, all the de-
cedents' heirs and next of kin were Scottish subjects and citizens, the investigation
of the accident was conducted by British authorities, and few evidentiary
problems would arise if the trial were held in Scotland since a large proportion of
the relevant evidence was located there. Id. at 257-61. In so holding the Supreme
Court stated:
[w]hen the home forum has been chosen [by the plaintiff], it is
reasonable to assume that this choice is convenient. When the plain-
tiff is foreign, however, this assumption is much less reasonable. Be-
cause the central purpose of any forum non conveniens inquiry is to
ensure that the trial is convenient, a foreign plaintiff's choice de-
serves less deference.
Id. at 255-56. The Court noted the consequences of according deferential treat-
ment to a foreign plaintiff's forum choice:
The American courts, which are already extremely attractive to for-
eign plaintiffs, would become even more attractive. The flow of liti-
gation into the United States would increase and further congest
already crowded courts.
Id. at 252; see also Rubenstein v. Piper Aircraft, Corp., 587 F. Supp. 460, 462 (S.D.
Fla. 1984) (refusing to hear a case brought by a foreign plaintiff in an American
court solely to increase the chances or rewards of victory).
102 See, e.g., Sigalas v. Lido Maritime, Inc., 776 F.2d 1512, 1519-20 (11 th Cir.
1985) (applying test established in Reyno to uphold lower court's dismissal on
grounds of forum non conveniens).
03 See, e.g., Houston v. Caldwell, 359 So. 2d 858 (Fla. 1978) (restricting the
application of forum non conveniens under Florida law to cases in which both
parties to the lawsuit reside outside of Florida and the cause of action arose
outside Florida).
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veniens. 104 To avoid removal on the basis of diversity, the
plaintiffs will only join nondiverse parties who are often
agents or joint venturers of the foreign state. Addition-
ally, plaintiffs will selectively fail to join the culpable for-
eign state to avoid removal to federal court under the
FSIA's liberal removal provisions.
C. NOLAN V. BOEING Co.
The decision in Nolan v. Boeing Co. 105 dealt a serious set-
back to the strategy by which foreign claimants bring suit
in state court and selectively sue only those defendants
whose presence prevents removal. In that case, wrongful
death claims were brought in Louisiana state court arising
from the crash in the United Kingdom of a Boeing 737-
400 aircraft, operated by British Midland Airways. No
American citizens were among those injured or killed.
Nonetheless, the foreign claimants brought suit in the
United States through two American attorneys who were
appointed administrators, curators, and/or tutors of the
225 foreign citizens injured or killed in the crash. Plain-
tiffs sued The Boeing Company (Boeing), which manufac-
tured the aircraft, General Electric Company (GE) and
CFM International, Inc. (CFMI), which jointly manufac-
tured and sold the engines. Although engine malfunction
was one alleged cause of the crash, plaintiffs failed to join
Societe Nationale d'Etude et de Construction de Moteurs
d'Aviation, S.A. (SNECMA), a commercial entity owned
by the French government, which manufactured the alleg-
edly malfunctioning aircraft engines in a joint venture
with GE.
Defendants first attempted to remove the actions to the
-o4 The District of Columbia and over 40 states have recognized the doctrine of
forum non conveniens, although some of these states severely restrict the doc-
trine's application. See Dow Chem. Co. v. Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674, 703
n.n.5,6 (Tex. 1990) (Hecht, J. dissenting), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1024 (1991); see
e.g., Houston v. Caldwell, 359 So. 2d 858, 859 (Fla. 1978) (holding that the doc-
trine was applicable only where the action does not involve Florida residents and
it accrues outside the state).
105 919 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 59 U.S. 3701 (1991).
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district court for the Eastern District of Louisiana on the
basis of diversity jurisdiction. Defendant, Boeing, was a
Delaware corporation with its principal place of business
in Washington; CFMI was a Delaware corporation with its
principal place of business in Ohio; and GE was a New
York corporation with its principal place of business in
New York. The plaintiffs were nondiverse citizens and
residents of New York and Washington. Consequently,
because the law, at the time, recognized only the citizen-
ship of the plaintiffs' appointed representative for diver-
sity purposes, the trial court properly remanded the cases
for lack of complete diversity. t0 6
Back in state court, defendant Boeing filed a third-party
complaint against SNECMA, a "foreign state" under the
FSIA. 0 7 SNECMA removed the original and third-party
claims to federal court. Plaintiffs moved to remand argu-
ing that the removal only removed the third-party and not
plaintiffs' original claims against the first-party defend-
ants. 08 Citing Arango, however, the district court held
that the FSIA removal removed the entire action, includ-
ing the first and third-party claims. 0 9 Subsequently, the
-08 Id. One week after the removal the amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 became
effective, providing that the citizenship of the represented party controls for pur-
poses of diversity. Id. at 1061 n.3.
107 The FSIA defines a foreign state as follows:
(a) A "foreign state", except as used in section 1608 of this title,
includes a political subdivision of a foreign state or an agency or
instrumentality of a foreign state as defined in subsection (b).
(b) an "agency or instrumentality of a foreign state" means any
entity-
(1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or other-
wise, and
(2) which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivi-
sion thereof, or a majority of whose shares or other owner-
ship interest is owned by a foreign state or political
subdivision thereof, and
(3) which is neither a citizen of a State of the United States
as defined in section 1332(c) and (d) of this title, nor created
under the laws of any third country.
28 U.S.C. § 1603(a)-(b) (1988).
108 Nolan, 919 F.2d at 1061-62.
09 At that time, the district courts which had addressed the issue had concluded
that a third-party removal by a foreign state pursuant to § 1441 (d) removed only
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federal trial court dismissed the actions on the basis of
forum non conveniens."t0
In upholding the trial court, the Fifth Circuit rejected
plaintiffs' argument that the first-party claims should be
remanded because the district .court lacked pendent party
jurisdiction over them. The court noted that Article III,
section 2 of the United States Constitution only requires
minimal diversity between the parties, a requirement
which was satisfied in the case."' Moreover, the court
concluded that, "[i]n view of the potential sensitivity of
actions against foreign states . . . [giving] foreign states
clear authority to remove to a federal forum actions
brought against them in state courts . . . ," the FSIA
should be broadly construed to permit removal of the en-
tire action and to confer pendent party jurisdiction, where
minimal diversity exists, over the nonfederal first-party
claims." 2 The Fifth Circuit, in effect, declared that the
federal policy favoring uniformity of decision and removal
in actions involving foreign states is not circumvented in
cases where plaintiffs selectively sue only domestic de-
fendants and then wait for one of them to implead the
third-party foreign state. The court stated:
[c]ontrary to appellants' position, we can perceive no
significant distinction between the authorization for re-
moval of an entire action by a sovereign co-defendant, and
removal of an entire action by a sovereign third-party de-
fendant. In fact, the interest of a sovereign third-party de-
fendant in removing the entire case may be more
compelling, because its liability is logically dependent on
the liability of a defendant in the main action. To protect
itself fully, a third-party defendant like SNECMA could be
called on to assert defenses on behalf of Boeing. The out-
the third-party but not the first party claims. See Filho v. Pozos Int'l Drilling
Servs., Inc., 662 F. Supp. 94 (S.D. Tex. 1987); Laughlin v. Dow Chem. Co., 563 F.
Supp. 271 (S.D. Tex. 1983); Alifieris v. American Airlines, Inc., 523 F. Supp. 1189
(E.D.N.Y. 1981).
11o Nolan, 919 F.2d at 1061-62.
1 Id. at 1063.
112 Id. at 1065.
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come of the main suit very much affects SNECMA's
rights.' 13
D. IN RE SURINAM AIRWAYS HOLDING CO.
A similar strategy was employed in consolidated cases
arising out of the June 7, 1989 crash of a Surinam Airways
flight from Amsterdam, the Netherlands, to Paramaribo,
Surinam in South America. 1 4 Several passengers, all citi-
zens of either the Netherlands or Surinam, filed personal
injury and wrongful death actions in Florida state court
naming the following as defendants: (1) the registered
owner of the aircraft; (2) a company holding a mortgage
interest in the plane; (3) a company performing turn-
around maintenance on the aircraft; (4) the company pro-
viding the cockpit crew; and (5) the estates of the pilot,
co-pilot, and flight engineer.' 15
The passengers did not sue Surinam Airways, the air
carrier and a "foreign state" under the FSIA. However,
one of the defendants, Air Crews International, which
provided the cockpit crew to the air carrier, filed a third-
party complaint against Surinam Airways for indemnity,
contribution and breach of the cockpit crew contract."l 6
Air Crews alleged that the airline breached the contract by
failing to operate the aircraft in accordance with applica-
ble regulations and by not providing insurance in favor of
Air Crews for the crews provided. Surinam Airways sub-
sequently removed the entire action pursuant to the FSIA,
among other bases." 17
"s Id. (citations omitted).
See In re Surinam Airways Holding Co., 974 F.2d 1255 (lth Cir. 1992);
Tauwnaar v. Surinam Airways Holding Co., No. 91-1558-CIV-RYSKAMP (S.D.
Fla. 1991) (Notice of Removal).
", In re Surinam Airways Holding Co., 974 F.2d at 1256 n.l.
116 Id. at 1256.
17 Although plaintiffs only pled state law causes of action, the defendants and
third-party defendants also removed the actions pursuant to the federal question
removal statute, arguing that both the first and third-party claims arose under the
exclusive federal cause of action created by a United States treaty which governs
passenger injury and death claims arising out of international air transportation.
See Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
1993] 729
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In response to plaintiffs' motion to remand, the district
court retained jurisdiction over only the third-party claims
and remanded the first-party claims that had not been
brought against any foreign state defendant. The court
first narrowly construed the language of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1330(a), which confers jurisdiction over "civil action[s]
against a foreign state," to extend jurisdiction only over
those claims brought directly against a foreign state.
Then the court held that, although it possessed "supple-
mental" jurisdiction over the main claims pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1367(c), it declined to exercise that jurisdiction
finding that the state law issues predominated in the main
claims.
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, however, re-
versed the district court's order of partial remand."t8 The
court held that the FSIA conferred subject matter jurisdic-
tion over both the first-party and third-party claims." 9 It
noted the congressional lafiguage expressly granting a
foreign state's right to remove not only those claims that
are brought against a foreign state but also those related
claims in the action that are brought against private enti-
ties. 120 Therefore, the Court held that such a right of re-
moval was equally conferred where third-party
contribution and indemnity claims were brought against a
foreign state.' 2 ' Otherwise, the congressional intent to
provide for a federal determination of all claims upon
Transportation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000 (1934), reprinted in note fol-
lowing 49 U.S.C. § 1502 (1970) (Warsaw Convention).
However, the district court held that the Warsaw Convention did not create the
exclusive cause of action for plaintiffs' state law claims. Therefore, for removal
purposes, the complaint did not arise under federal law under the complete pre-
emption exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule. See Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58 (1987).
In reversing the district court on other grounds, the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals found it unnecessary to determine whether the case was properly re-
moved pursuant to the federal question removal statute. In re Surinam Airways
Holding Co., 974 F.2d at 1258 n.7.
118 In re Surinam Airways Holdings Co., 974 F.2d at 1260-61.
" Id. at 1260.
120 Id.
121 Id.
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which the foreign state's third-party liability directly de-
pended would be frustrated.122  The court further held
that, once a third-party foreign state removes the entire
action under the FSIA, the district court lacks the discre-
tion to remand the related first-party claims. 23
E. THE JUDICIAL IMPROVEMENTS ACT OF 1990
Since the scope of an FSIA removal is related to the
concept of pendent party jurisdiction, 24 recent changes
in the pendent party doctrine are worth noting.
In reaction to Finley v. United States,' 25 which held that
federal subject matter jurisdiction does not extend to pen-
dent party claims unless provided by statute,12 6 Congress
enacted the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990 (the
Act).' 2 7 Title III, section 310 of the Act replaces the con-
cepts of pendent party and pendent claim jurisdiction
with a single "supplemental" jurisdiction.s'2  The Act pro-
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 See, e.g., Arango v. Guzman Travel Advisors Corp., 621 F.2d 1371, 1375-76
(5th Cir. 1980).
125 490 U.S. 545 (1989).
126 Id. at 554.
127 Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089, 5113 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1367
(Supp. 11 1990)).
128 Section 310 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (Supp. 11 1990)), provides in perti-
nent part:
(a) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as expressly
provided otherwise by Federal statute, in any civil action of which
the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall
have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so re-
lated to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that
they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of
the United States Constitution. Such supplemental jurisdiction shall
include claims that involve the joinder or intervention of additional
parties.
(b) In any civil action of which the district courts have original
jurisdiction founded solely on section 1332 of this title, the district
courts shall not have supplemental jurisdiction under subsection (a)
over claims by plaintiffs against persons made parties under Rule 14,
19, 20, or 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or over claims
by persons proposed to be joined as plaintiffs under Rule 19 of such
rules, or seeking to intervene as plaintiffs under Rule 24 of such
rules, when exercising supplemental jurisdiction over such claims
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vides that, subject to specific exceptions, in any civil ac-
tion where the district courts have original jurisdiction
over some claim, the court shall have supplemental juris-
diction over "all other claims that are so related to claims
in the action within such original jurisdiction that they
form part of the same case or controversy under Article
III of the United States Constitution."'' 2 9 Moreover, such
supplemental jurisdiction includes "claims that involve
the joinder or intervention of additional parties."13 1
The legislative history of these amendments indicates
that Congress intended to legislatively overrule Finley's13 '
presumption that pendent party jurisdiction is not con-
gressionally authorized and replace it with the presump-
tion that it is always authorized, unless expressly
excepted. 3 2  Congress has thus clarified that pendent
would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of section
1332.
(c) The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental juris-
diction over a claim under section (1) if-
(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law,
(2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims
over which the district court has original jurisdiction,
(3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has
original jurisdiction, or
(4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling rea-
sons for declining jurisdiction.
ld.
129 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). This supplemental jurisdiction is subject to statutory
exceptions, for example, certain claims in diversity cases. Id. § 1367(b)-(c).
,s 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (emphasis added).
1,' 490 U.S. 545 (1989).
112 As reported in United States Law Week:
Section 310 codifies the concepts of pendent and ancillary juris-
diction under a new label called "supplemental jurisdiction" and ef-
fectively overrules Finley v. U.S., 490 U.S. 545 (1989).
As a result of Finley, some lower courts have declined to exercise
jurisdiction in formerly unquestioned circumstances involving join-
der and intervention.
Congress has now stepped in with Section 310, which will appear
at 28 U.S.C. § 1367. In federal question cases, Section 1367(a)
broadly authorizes district courts to exercise supplemental jurisdic-
tion over additional claims, including claims involving thejoinder or
intervention of additional parties. These supplemental claims must,
under the new statute, be "so related to claims in the action with
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party or supplemental jurisdiction potentially extends to
all "constitutional cases" as defined in United Mine Workers
v. Gibbs,' 33 i.e., all cases arising from a "common nucleus
of operative fact."' 34
The decision in Colgan v. Port Authority '35 is instructive.
In that case, plaintiff brought a personal injury action
against the Port Authority, Lodige Air Cargo Systems,
and Lufthansa German Airlines, the latter a foreign state
under the FSIA. Lufthansa removed the action pursuant
to the FSIA's removal provisions, and plaintiff moved to
remand. In denying the motion, the court noted that the
action was properly removed and that it not only had pen-
dent party jurisdiction over the nonfederal claims against
the domestic defendants under Nolan and Teledyne, but
that it also had supplemental jurisdiction over those
claims under the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990.136
Other courts construing the Judicial Improvements Act
of 1990, in the context of air crash litigation, may ap-
proach the issue in a way similar to the Third Circuit in
Sinclair v. Soniform, Inc., i s a decision involving an analo-
gous personal injury claim. In that case, a scuba diver
brought suit for injuries received when his buoyancy com-
pensator vest malfunctioned and caused him to ascend
from a dive too rapidly. Plaintiff sued the manufacturer of
the vest and the crew of the vessel for their failure to de-
tect his symptoms and render medical care. The court
held that the claims against the crew fell under the district
court's admiralty jurisdiction and that the claims against
such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or
controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution." 28
U.S.C. § 1367(a) (Supp. 11 1990). This provision codifies the scope
of supplemental jurisdiction first articulated in United Mine Workers v.
Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966), and explicitly fills the statutory gap noted
in Finley.
Legislation: Mixed Bag of Changes Designed to Improve Federal Practice, 59 U.S.L.W. at
2419 (Jan. 15, 1991).
1-1 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
34 Id. at 725.
13- No. 91-CV-1136, 1991 WL 180384 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 1991).
I16 Id. at *3-4.
137 935 F.2d 599 (3d Cir. 1991).
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the manufacturers were supported by the federal court's
supplemental jurisdiction. 13 8 In so holding, the Third
Circuit stated:
[riecently, Congress codified the existence of supplemen-
tal jurisdiction in 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (West Supp. 1991):
"[I]n any civil action of which the district courts have orig-
inal jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemen-
tal jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to
claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that
they form part of the same case or controversy under Arti-
cle III of the United States Constitution. Such supple-
mental jurisdiction shall include claims that involve the
joinder.., of additional parties." Claims are part of the
same constitutional case if they "derive from a common
nucleus of operative fact," and "are such that [the plain-
tiff] would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one
judicial proceeding .. .
Sinclair's claims against the crew and his claims against
the manufacturers did arise from a common nucleus of op-
erative fact. Both sets of claims are based on the same
purported injuries stemming from the same scuba diving
incident. Those injuries were allegedly caused by the neg-
ligence of both the crew and the manufacturer. Accord-
ingly, we find that Sinclair's claims against the
manufacturers fall within the district court's supplemental
jurisdiction.' 9
In addition to delineating the court's supplemental ju-
risdiction, however, the Judicial Improvements Act of
1990140 also outlines when claims should be remanded.14 '
For example, when an action is removed on the basis of
diversity, there is no supplemental jurisdiction over re-
lated non-federal claims when the exercise of such juris-
diction would be contrary to the requirements of the
diversity jurisdiction statute. 42
138 Id. at 602-03.
'39 Id. at 603 (citations omitted) (quoting United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383
U.S. 715, 725 (1966)).
140 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (Supp. H 1990).
141 Id. § 1367(c).
142 Id. § 1367(b).
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Moreover, § 1367(c) permits the court to remand
nonfederal claims which raise novel issues of state law, or
cases in which the district court has dismissed all claims
over which it has original jurisdiction. 43 For example, in
Seal v. University of Pittsburgh,144 a federal question removal
case, the court, after dismissing a federal civil rights claim,
held that it would remand state law wrongful discharge
claims since "none of the remaining claims ... [touch
upon] federal policy .... [T]hese claims embrace unclear
and unique issues of law of a particular interest to Penn-
sylvania which are better left to the attention of the Com-
monwealth's appellate courts. 145
However, because the federal forum is favored in ac-
tions involving a foreign state, this discretion to remand
should be exercised less frequently in FSIA cases. The
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in In re Surinam Airways
Holding Co. 146 held that the district court had no discretion
to remand pendent party (supplemental) main claims
once an entire action was removed by a third-party for-
eign state defendant pursuant to the FSIA. 47 Similarly, in
Colgan, the court summarily declined to exercise its discre-
tion under § 1367 to remand the domestic claims which
had been removed by a foreign state pursuant to the
FSIA.' 48 And, in Teledyne Inc. v. Kane Corp. ,149 a case not
decided under the Judicial Improvements Act, the Ninth
Circuit approved of the district court's retention and sub-
sequent dismissal of the pendent party claims against the
private defendants, even after it dismissed the claims
against the removing foreign state on the basis of immu-
nity. 150 In a case which may suggest the approach other
courts might take in other FSIA cases decided under the
'45 Id. § 1367(c).
'4 766 F. Supp. 386 (W.D. Pa. 1991).
145 Id. at 388.
146 974 F.2d 1255 (11th Cir. 1992).
147 Id. at 1260.
148 Colgan v. Port Authority, No. 91-CV-1136, 1991 WL 180384, at *1
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 1991).
149 892 F.2d 1404 (9th Cir. 1989).
' Id. at 1410 n.2.
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Act, the Teledyne court held that such an exercise of pen-
dent party jurisdiction is "particularly appropriate" where
the adjudication involves a dismissal and therefore obvi-
ates an unnecessary trial, and where the dismissal of the
pendent party claims are based on federal law.' 5'
V. FRAUDULENT JOINDER
Because the FSIA confers federal question jurisdiction
on federal courts, 52 the concept of fraudulent joinder,
which is most often implicated in diversity removals, does
not arise in FSIA cases. The fraudulent joinder test, how-
ever, has been employed in cases involving foreign states
and a claim of "collusive" joinder. By way of a preface to
the discussion on collusive joinder, it is important to note
the evolution of the fraudulent joinder test in cases in-
volving diversity removal.
Removal on the basis of diversity is precluded where
any defendant is a citizen of the state in which an action is
brought. 55  Although joinder of a nondiverse defendant
defeats removal, the citizenship of a fraudulently joined
defendant is disregarded for the purpose of determining
the propriety of removal on the basis of diversity. 154
I-1 d. (quoting Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 548 (1974)) (stating that "con-
siderations favoring state adjudication are wholly irrelevant where the pendent
claim is federal").
152 Verlinden, B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 491-93 (1983).
153 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)-(b) (1988) provides:
[e]xcept as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any
civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the
United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the de-
fendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States
for the district and division embracing the place where such action is
pending. For purposes of removal under this chapter, the citizen-
ship of defendants sued under fictitious names shall be disregarded.
Any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdic-
tion founded on a claim or right arising under the Constitution, trea-
ties or laws of the United States shall be removable without regard
to the citizenship or residence of the parties. Any other such action
shall be removable only if none of the parties in interest properly joined and
served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought.
Id. (emphasis added).
- Cabalceta v. Standard Fruit Co., 883 F.2d 1553, 1561 (11th Cir. 1989).
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Therefore, a motion to dismiss a defendant on the basis of
fraudulent joinder is most often asserted by a co-defend-
ant wishing to dismiss the nondiverse party who is
preventing the removal of the action. 5 As the key cases
demonstrate, however, fraudulent joinder is only estab-
lished where it is shown that the plaintiff cannot possibly
state a cause of action against the nondiverse defendant
or where the plaintiff has fraudulently pled jurisdictional
facts.
The general "fraudulent joinder" test is illustrated in
Parks v. New York Times Co.' 56 The plaintiff in Parks
brought a libel suit in Alabama state court against the
New York Times, a non-resident, and four individual Ala-
bama residents, who it claimed had endorsed the libel by
failing to disavow the libelous statement. The New York
Times removed the action to federal court on the basis
that complete diversity existed between itself and the
plaintiff. The defendant argued that the citizenship of the
non-diverse defendants should be disregarded because
they were fraudulently joined. The trial court agreed and
denied plaintiff's motion to remand. In reversing the trial
court, however, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals stated
the test for fraudulent joinder as follows:
[W]e take the rule to be that there can be no fraudulent
joinder unless it be clear that there can be no recovery
under the law of the state on the cause alleged, or on the
facts in view of the law as they exist when the petition to
remand is heard. One or the other at least would be re-
quired before it could be said that there was no real inten-
tion to get a joint judgment, and that there was no
colorable ground for so claiming.' 57
Therefore, finding that the plaintiff had stated a libel
claim against the resident defendants, the court held that
removal based on diversity was improper and that the
155 Id.
M5 308 F.2d 474 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 949 (1964).
57 Id. at 478.
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case should have been remanded. 58
Similarly, in Cabalceta v. Standard Fruit Co., 59 the Elev-
enth Circuit stated:
[t]he test for determining whether or not a defendant
has been fraudulently joined is twofold: (1) look to see
whether there is no possibility the plaintiff can establish
any cause of action against the resident defendant; and (2)
look to see whether plaintiff has fraudulently pled jurisdic-
tional facts in order to bring the resident defendant into
state court. 1 60
Additionally, one commentator has noted that a recent
Fifth Circuit case has made a fraudulent joinder removal
easier by requiring the court to weigh the allegations in
the pleadings, as well as the evidence in affidavits and
depositions, to determine whether plaintiff could ulti-
mately recover against the allegedly fraudulently joined
defendant.' 6' As will be discussed below, the "fraudu-
lent" joinder test is also applicable to cases involving a
claim of "collusive" joinder.
358 Id. at 479-81.
- 883 F.2d 1553 (11th Cir. 1989).
- Id. at 1561. Additionally, in international tort litigation, the fraudulentjoin-
der test may require that the court determine whether the plaintiff has stated a
claim against the nondiverse defendant under foreign law. In Barrantes Cabalceta v.
Standard Fruit Co., 667 F. Supp. 833 (S.D. Fla. 1987), Costa Rican citizens brought
suit against various defendants in Florida state court arising from injuries alleg-
edly sustained from exposure to harmful pesticides while plaintiffs were employed
in defendant's plantation in Costa Rica. One of the defendants removed the ac-
tion to federal court and moved to dismiss the nondiverse party on the basis of
"fraudulent joinder." The trial court denied the plaintiffs' motion to remand,
holding that the nondiverse defendant had been fraudulently joined because
there was "no reasonable basis in fact or colorable ground supporting the claim
against [it]." Id. at 836. The district court then dismissed the actions on the basis
of forum non conveniens. Id. at 839.
However, in reversing the decision, the court of appeals noted that the district
court partly based its forum non conveniens dismissal on the premise that the law
of Costa Rica would govern in the actions. Standard Fruit Co., 883 F.2d at 1562.
Therefore, the court held that since Costa Rican law would apply, the district
court erred in failing to evaluate the allegations of the complaint under Costa
Rican law to determine whether a colorable claim could be stated against the non-
diverse "fraudulently joined" defendant. Id.
161 See Allen B. Rich, Current Issues in Removal Jurisdiction, 57 J. AIR L. & CoM.
395, 400-01 (1991).
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VI. COLLUSIVE JOINDER
Whereas "fraudulent joinder" appears in cases where a
party seeks to improperly defeat federal jurisdiction, the
concept of "collusive joinder" appears in cases where a
party seeks to improperly create it. Federal law, however,
deprives the federal district court of subject matter juris-
diction in cases where a party has been collusively joined
for the purpose of creating federal jurisdiction. Title 28
U.S.C. § 1359 provides:
[a] district court shall not have jurisdiction of a civil ac-
tion in which any party, by assignment or otherwise, has
been improperly or collusively made or joined to invoke
the jurisdiction of such court.' 62
Section 1359 was enacted to prevent the use of federal
courts where the suit does not really and substantially in-
volve a dispute or controversy properly within federal
court jurisdiction. 63 Generally, cases involving a claim of
collusive joinder manufacture diversity jurisdiction by
either (1) the appointment of a diverse administrator or
fiduciary acting on behalf of a nondiverse beneficiary, or
(2) the illusory assignment of a claim to a diverse party
solely for the purpose of permitting the real party in inter-
est to collect an essentially state law claim in federal
court. 164
In determining whether there has been collusion in the
appointment of an administrator or fiduciary as plaintiff in
personal injury litigation, courts analyze whether reasons
exist for the appointment other than the creation of diver-
sity of citizenship. 165 A key determinant in the analysis is
the relationship between the administrator and the party
162 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1988).
163 Bishop v. Hendricks, 495 F.2d 289, 293 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1056
(1974).
- See O'Brien v. Avco Corp., 425 F.2d 1030 (2d Cir. 1969) (appointing out-of-
state administrator to replace resident administrator for the sole avowed purpose of
creating diversity to prosecute state law claim in federal court).
165 Bishop, 495 F.2d at 292.
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represented. 6 Therefore, in Hackney v. Newman Memorial
Hospital, Inc.,167 the appointment of the decedent's sister
as administratrix in a wrongful death action was held not
to be collusive where the sister was a statutory beneficiary
and had a real, substantive interest in the action. 68
In Gilbert v. Wills ' 69 however, the Eleventh Circuit held
that diversity had been collusively manufactured in a
wrongful death suit filed in Florida. 70 In this case, the
decedent's spouse, a diverse party with respect to the
tortfeasors, entered into an agreement with decedent's
nondiverse children. The children agreed not to exercise
their statutory right to intervene in the suit, in exchange
for a share in the surviving spouse's recovery.' 7'
Section 1359, however, is not successfully raised in
cases that involve neither an appointment nor an assign-
ment. In Nolan v. Boeing Co. 172 foreign plaintiffs brought
wrongful death claims in Louisiana state court. Their
claims arose out of an air crash in the United Kingdom,
allegedly caused by a malfunctioning engine. One of the
defendants, Boeing, filed third-party indemnity and con-
tribution claims against the French state-owned engine
manufacturer (SNECMA). The French company, a "for-
eign state," removed the actions under the FSIA. In the
district court, the defendants and the third-party defend-
ant then moved to dismiss the actions on the basis of the
federal forum non conveniens standard.
Plaintiffs moved for leave to ascertain through discov-
ery whether the third-party defendant had been collu-
sivelyjoined in order to facilitate removal of the actions to
166 Id. at 294 n.24.
167 621 F.2d 1069 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 982 (1980).
- Id. at 1071.
169 834 F.2d 935 (11th Cir. 1987).
170 Id. at 937.
171 Recent changes in the diversity jurisdiction statute may have eliminated the
incentive to make collusive appointments in certain cases. Title 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(c)(2) now provides that the legal representative of an estate, infant or in-
competent shall be deemed to be a citizen of the state of the decedent, infant or
incompetent, respectively.
172 919 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1587 (1991).
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federal court and thus take advantage of the federal forum
non conveniens standard. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the
district court's denial of discovery, noting that Boeing had
stated valid claims against the foreign state.17 3 In dis-
missing the collusion charge, the court applied the
"fraudulent joinder" standard, stating:
Appellants contend next that the district court commit-
ted error in dismissing these actions on forum non con-
veniens grounds without first allowing them to conduct
discovery for purposes of proving collusion among the de-
fendants to create federal subject matter jurisdiction. This
is a frivolous argument.
Boeing has a substantial claim for contribution and in-
demnity against SNECMA, hence there is nothing con-
trived about the foundation for federal jurisdiction here.
As the First Circuit recently observed, "parties may legiti-
mately try to obtain the jurisdiction of federal courts, as
long as they lawfully qualify under some of the grounds
that allow access to this forum of limited jurisdiction." ...
Because the appellants offered no evidence that Boeing or
SNECMA manufactured the jurisdictional facts necessary
to remove this case to federal court pursuant to § 1441 (d),
the district court's denial of discovery was proper.' 74
Similarly, in In re Surinam Airway Holding Co. ,75 a case in
which the foreign state expressly waived its FSIA immu-
nity, plaintiffs' collusion challenge to the joinder of and
removal by the foreign state was wholly ignored by the
Eleventh Circuit in its decision upholding the removal. 76
VII. CONCLUSION
Although the commercial activity and other exceptions
to foreign sovereign immunity impose strict limits on the
173 Id. at 1067.
'14 Id. at 1067-68 (citations omitted).
'75 974 F.2d 1255 (11th Cir. 1992).
176 The lower court's magistrate in In re Surinam Airways Holding Co., dismissed
plaintiffs' collusion argument, although it found the air carrier's waiver of immu-
nity "ironic." United States Magistrate's Report and Recommendation, at 14.
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joinder of foreign states in international tort litigation
brought in United States courts, once successfully joined,
a foreign state has a significant impact on the case. The
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act imposes few obstacles
to the removal of a case to federal court. As long as one
claim is properly asserted against a foreign state, the FSIA
permits the removal of an entire action. The presence of
a foreign state, therefore, effectively federalizes an action
brought in state court and transports defendants to an
often more hospitable forum in which to assert forum non
conveniens and other defensive motions.
Comments

